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RELIGION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: 
CONTESTING THE OBVIOUS
Introduction
Religion in America must be regarded as the first of their political institutions1
Alexis de Tocqueville
The role of religion in U.S. foreign policy is a very complex issue. Dependent on 
the personal attitude of the researcher, religion can play a major or secondary role 
in analyzing the process of shaping American behavior in international relations.
This topic is extremely difficult for political scientists (and I daresay for 
other scholarly approaches as well) due to its inherently internal nature. It is easier 
to research and analyze open, accessible and, even if controversial, publicly discus-
sed topics. However, this is not the case with religion. When asked to contribute 
to the volume on this topic the first feeling was confusion. Undoubtedly, there is 
religious inclination in the deeds and actions of the following American admini-
strations, but does that mean that all the actions are guided by religious principles? 
Does it mean that the point of relevance is the divine principles of Christianity? Is 
the Decalogue the driving force of American foreign policy? Ultimately, how can 
we measure this topic? I will risk saying no to these questions.
This would mean that there should have been no wars with U.S. involve-
ment, that there should have been no deception, that once being attacked the U.S. 
should not have retaliated, but accepted reality and simply turned the other cheek. 
1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, ed. A. A. Knopf, p. 305; also quoted by S. P. Hunting-
ton, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, New York 2004, p. 85.
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It would mean that charity should have been unconditional and that suffering sho-
uld not have been caused. If Christian values could overshadow national interests, 
national security and individual wellbeing, maybe that could have been possible. 
But it isn’t. What to research then?
Generally, there are three research areas that are most often exploited con-
cerning the role of religion in the American foreign policy decision-making process 
that can be traced in the scholarship on the subject. Some scholars focus on the acti-
vities abroad of particular American religious groups or denominations and attempt 
to evaluate their impact. Some, like Jeffrey Haynes or Walter Russell Mead, at-
tempt to emphasize the importance of the religious vote in the presidential elections 
as well as the importance of selected religious groups on U.S. foreign policy. This 
indirect impact cannot be underestimated, but it should also not be overestimated. 
In certain cases, pressure from religious groups can augment or even determine 
certain political action. However, this model requires that other groups will not 
have significant interest in the case or that the religious motives supplement other 
political rationales.
Others have attempted to emphasize the role of religion in the actions of 
selected U.S. presidents. In U.S. presidential history cases can be found when reli-
gion plays more important role than usual. Remarkably in this case, instead of the 
Republican-Democrat political division, a rather Idealist-Realist division should be 
introduced in order to organize the American presidents. The impact of religion on 
Woodrow Wilson’s deeds is commonly recognized among American scholars. My 
later remarks will also trace religious motifs in Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s rhe-
toric and actions. The role of religion in the activities, policies and actions of other 
American presidents are also examined.2 Despite the interesting conclusions, due 
to the chronologically limited research in these papers, they can hardly answer the 
more general question on the impact of religion on the decision-making process in 
the United States.
The third group of scholars focuses on the American actions promoting reli-
gious freedom abroad and analyzing the implementation of the International Reli-
gious Freedom Act of 1998.3 In this case, however, firstly, the consequences of the 
decision-making process are analyzed. Secondly, the rather pessimist conclusion 
made by Thomas Farr, that the implementation of IRFA provisions is not excluded 
from the mainstream decision-making process, which is much more realist and thus 
2 M. Magee, What the Word Should Be, Waco 2008. See also among the numerous studies on the impact 
of religion on the American presidents: D. Jason Berggren and N. C. Rae, Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: 
Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style, “Presidential Studies Quarterly” 2006, Vol. 36, No. 
4, p. 606–632. See also Jeffrey Haynes’s deliberations on Religious Fragmentation and Politics in An Introduction 
to International Relations and Religion, Pearson Longman 2007, p. 238–242; W. Dzielski, W. Michnik, Religia 
w polityce zagranicznej USA – na przykładzie prezydentury George’a W. Busha, “Teologia Polityczna” 2006–2007, 
No. 4: www.teologiapolityczna.pl/assets/numery_tp/tp4/dzielskimichnik_religia_w_polityce_zagranicznej_usa.
pdf [29.10.2011].
3 T. F. Farr, Word of Faith and Freedom, Why International Religious Liberty is Vital to American National 
Security, Oxford 2008.
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often these idealistic provisions are eschewed for other aims. Last but not least, this 
group of scholars actually neglects the fact that even the sole promotion of religious 
freedom abroad can be considered as a source of anti-Americanism.
None of these approaches embraces in a comprehensive manner the role of 
religion in American foreign policy. When I started discussing the subject with my 
colleagues, the first question that appeared was “what religion?” The United States 
is today described as a melting pot, hotchpotch or salad bowl. No matter what de-
scription serves our theoretical assumptions best, the United States is a conglome-
rate of various religious, denominational and sectarian strands. It is also true that in 
comparison to other parts of the globe, there is no more open and suitable ground 
for coexistence of various forms of praising the divine/transcendental.
Furthermore, before searching for the impact of religion on American fore-
ign policy, comments of a more general nature need to be made. The uniqueness 
of American society includes the separation of the church and the state on the one 
hand, and the remarkable religiousness of the American society in general.
American society seems to be much more religious than its European coun-
terpart.4 Unlike in Europe, however, religion is sealed in the private and local sphe-
re and subjugated by the necessity for tolerance in the public sphere. Still, several 
arguments for the higher prospects for religious presence can be made. Firstly, 
large portions of Americans (approx. from 40 to 70%) regularly attend religious se-
rvices. Secondly, strong ties exist between religious affiliation and ethnic identity in 
the U.S. Thirdly, there is a remarkable diversity of religious opinions in the United 
States. Because of these factors, religion is an important feature in defining terms 
of political competition in America.
Religion and American politics
As early as 1960, Luke Ebersole noticed that religious affiliation is not directly 
linked with political preferences. It cannot be ruled out that generalizations con-
cerning the predominant support of particular religious groups for political parties 
exist. Explanations such as “conservatives vote for the Republicans” or “Jews vote 
for the Democrats,” and the even more general “the Democratic party is the party 
for minorities” can be heard during every election campaign. Even, if these genera-
lizations indicate certain tendencies, they again do not say anything about the sub-
sequent role of religion in the post-election political process and, in particular, on 
the practical impact of these votes on the policies of the particular administration. 
Is it that religious attitudes are blended in the political whirl and lose their transcen-
dental halo, merging into the mainstream confrontation of interests? 
4 Samuel Huntington emphasizes this aspect in a more diplomatic way, underlining the stronger religious-
ness of the Americans in comparison to the other industrialized countries. He does that several times in his chapter 
on the religious aspect of the American society in his book: S. Huntington, Who We Are..., p. 83–106.
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Ebersole recalls a number of surveys from the late 1940s showing that al-
though certain tendencies of religious political attitudes can be observed, they are 
neither steady nor decisive for the final results of election campaigns. Walter Rus-
sell Mead, although enthusiastic about the conservative revival during the Bush 
administration, summarizes that “Religion in the United States is too pluralistic for 
any single current to dominate”.5
A few years after Ebersole’s paper, in 1967, Robert Bellah systematized the 
role of religion in the United States. His essay “Civil Religion in America” struc-
tured the perception of religion’s role in society. Before analyzing Bellah’s theory, 
another observation needs to be made. What unites all research efforts concerning 
the role of religion is the obligatory mentioning of the legal framework of religious 
freedom in the United States. The constitutional provisions of the First Amendment 
prohibiting the establishment of official religion are underlined as a cornerstone of 
the American political system.6 This, supplanted by the famous “wall of separa-
tion” and the generally accepted principle of recognition of religious alternatives in 
American society, provide the necessary fundaments for the flourishing of religious 
diversity. As Bellah rightly observes, 
The principle of separation of church and state guarantees the freedom of religious belief 
and association, but at the same time clearly segregates the religious sphere, which is considered to 
be essentially private, from the political one.7
On the other hand, as Haynes notices, 
[…] rooted in unique historical legacy, there is both religious pluralism and vibrancy in the 
USA. This is, Haynes says, quoting Steve Bruce, …contrary to what the secularization thesis proposes: 
religious pluralism is associated in the USA with increased, rather than diminished, religious adherence.8
There is general agreement among scholars that one of the sources, if not 
the main one, of establishing the English colonies was the religious tensions in 
England and other European states.9 Various religious patterns of behavior, empha-
sizing more conservative or tolerating attitudes, were shipped to the United States 
and were among the constitutive elements of the basis for the American model of 
relationship between the state and the individual. Andrzej Bryk admits that the core 
5 W. Russell Mead, God’s Country?, “Foreign Affairs” 2006, Vol. 85, No. 5, p. 41.
6 L. Ebersole, Politics and Religion, “Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science” 
1960, Vol. 332 (Religion in American Society), p. 102.
7 R. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, Reprinted by permission of Dædalus, “Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences”, from the issue entitled Religion in America, Winter 1967, Vol. 96, No. 1, p. 1–21, 
available at: www.robertbellah.com/articles_5.htm [29.10.2011].
8 J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Pearson Longman 2007, p. 239. See 
also: Religion and Modernization, ed. S. Bruce, Oxford 1992, p. 1–7.
9 Historians, political scientists, lawyers, sociologists and others agree and repeat unequivocally the re-
ligious impact on the new colonies. Z. Lewicki, Historia cywilizacji amerykańskiej. Era tworzenia, 1607–1789, 
Warszawa 2009, p. 215–238; H. Broghan, Historia Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki, Wrocław 2004, p. 100–124.
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of American religion is Protestant in its nature, with its eschatological mission10. 
Thus the faith in the new continent was further supplanted by the Calvinistic con-
cept of predestination that played a vital role, since it provided that the Scriptures 
teach both the sovereign control of God and the responsibility and freedom of hu-
man decisions11. They were additionally strengthened by John Winthrop’s “city 
upon a hill” interpretation, which provided sufficient arguments for the settlers to 
consider themselves as citizens of “God’s Country”. These pillars of the American 
credo have a profound impact on the American foreign policy. They also provided 
fertile ground for the development of another, unique level of religiousness able to 
summarize the strongly individualist society, devoted to God in alternative ways. 
“Civil religion” is a unique American secularist-religious amalgamate.
Civil religion
The uniqueness of American religion is in its Judeo-Christian tradition. Mauk and 
Oakland rightly observed that this is a symbiosis of two main developments in 
American history. On the one hand, the early settlers’ religious pluralism, although 
recently highly idealized, requires acknowledgment in comparison to the European 
attitude in the same period. It was based in the Protestant tradition, which naturally 
spurred tolerated12 alternative approaches towards the relationship between the in-
dividual and God. It also searched for protective mechanisms against the potential 
religious conflicts well known from Europe. The alternative was a much softer and 
moderate acceptance of various transcendental explanations, as long as they were 
grounded in the Judeo-Christian theology.
The second element is the natural inclusiveness of the American society that 
required human capacity to subordinate the vast new territory. The uniqueness of 
the immigration to the United States until the late 19th century is its predominantly 
Judeo-Christian character, which did not require social mobilization against funda-
mentally alternative religious doctrines.13 Hence, Samuel Huntington’s argument 
10 A. Bryk, Cywilizacja amerykańska, www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/596/bryk596.html [27.10.2011].
11 On predestination see: J. Herbold Rainbow, The Will of God and the Cross: An Historical and Theo-
logical Study of John Calvin’s Doctrine of Limited Redemption, Allison Park 1990; P. J. Thuesen, Predestination: 
The American Career Of A Contentious Doctrine, New York 2009; also M. Levering, Predestination: Biblical and 
Theological Paths, New York 2011.
12 The word tolerant in this case means only comparatively wider margin of acceptance towards alterna-
tive Protestant approaches, and does not embrace the innate distrust for Catholics. The full lists of characteristic 
features of Mauk and Oakland’s description of American religion and Huntington’s definition of civil religion are 
published respectively in: D. Mauk, J. Oakland, Cywilizacja amerykańska, Wrocław 1999, p. 295; S. P. Hunting-
ton, Who Are We?..., p. 104. On civil religion in the Polish scholar literature see: M. Potz, Granice wolności reli-
gijnej, kwestie wolności sumienia i wyznania oraz stosunku państwa do religii w Stanach Zjednoczonych Ameryki, 
Wrocław 2008, p. 202–218; as well as: R. Małajny, “Mur separacji” – państwo a Kościół w Stanach Zjednoczo-
nych Ameryki, Katowice 1992, p. 323–329.
13 However, the anti-Catholic inclination of the Know Nothing party and the Ku Klux Klan should not be 
neglected. Although examples of hatred and persecutions were observed, their intensity was much lower than in 
comparison to the Asian immigration since the late 19th century.
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on the religious base of the American society is rooted in the general conviction 
that whatever religious tensions appeared in the American society, they were al-
ways in the frames of the same creed.
These tensions required an overarching element binding the various appro-
aches in one ideal, resistant to external influence. The American experience, inclu-
siveness and success grounded in the popular will provided the needed constituted 
parts for America itself to become a source of religion – the civil religion. Bellah 
explains that 
[…] the civil religion expressed what those who set the precedents felt was appropriate under 
the circumstances. It reflected their private as well as public views. Nor was the civil religion simply 
‘religion in general.’ […] While generality was undoubtedly seen as a virtue by some, […] the civil 
religion was specific enough when it came to the topic of America. Precisely because of this specifi-
city, the civil religion was saved from empty formalism and served as a genuine vehicle of national 
religious self-understanding.14
Later, he says that civil religion is also 
[…] certain common elements of religious orientation that the great majority of Americans 
share. These have played a crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide 
a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political sphere. This public 
religious dimension is expressed in a set of beliefs, symbols, and rituals that I am calling American 
civil religion.15
Bellah concludes 
The God of the civil religion is not only rather ‘unitarian,’ he is also on the austere side, 
much more related to order, law, and right than to salvation and love,16
thus emphasizing the practical aspect of the religion’s social purpose. While, 
embracing Christianity in the widest possible terms, American reality used religion 
as a source of political and social organization. Remarkably, not in terms of uncom-
promising civil obligation characteristic in Europe since 1648, but rather as a sour-
ce of common knowledge and guiding light for behavior. As it is often described,
[…] civil religion converts Americans from religious people of many denominations into 
a nation with the soul of a church.17
14 R. Bellah, Civil Religion in America...
15 Ibidem.
16 Ibidem.
17 The term “a nation with the soul of a church” can be found in numerous publications. It was in operation 
already in 1967, when S. E. Mead wrote the article titled The Nation with the Soul of a Church, “Church History” 
1967, Vol. 36, (September), p. 262–283, and was later quoted among others by D. O’Brien, in American Catholi-
cism and American Religion, “Journal of the American Academy of Religion” 1972, Vol. 40, No. 1, p. 40. Recently 
S. P. Huntington also used it in his book, Who Are We?..., p. 106.
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While focusing on the external aspect of civil religion, it should not be for-
gotten that, ultimately, it plays a much more important role at home. As Haynes 
acknowledges, civil religion 
[…] was a fundamental requisite for stable democracy in America, given that civil religion 
made a positive contribution to societal integration by binding a fractious people around a common 
goal, imparting a sacred character to civic obligation. […] civil religion also provided an important 
public manifestation of religion, as opposed to the more privatized orientations of particular faiths.18
The civil religion used the success of the American political experiment to 
unify the mixture of individuals called Americans. The source of their unification 
is not only religion per se but also the much more earthy pursuit of happiness and 
freedom from want that proved to be best achievable in the United States. Hence, 
the political mechanisms that provided the necessary environment to be successful 
were naturally elevated to a higher “semi-transcendental” rank for securing their 
existence. The Founding Fathers were “beatified” and their legacy idealized, be-
cause it proved to be moderate and wise, far-sighted and practical, pragmatic and 
flexible – thus providing a much wider spectrum of possibilities for the individual. 
Huntington embraces this in his fourth point describing civil religion, where he 
underlines the religious aura of such national celebrations as Thanksgiving or Ve-
terans Day and the official celebrations of presidential inaugurations and funerals.19 
There is probably no better proof of the power of American attractiveness than the 
constant flow of immigrants to the United States, which, although declining in the 
last decade as a result of the economic and political difficulties, even today does 
not cease.20 Furthermore, America still remains an ideal, a promised land for those 
exploited and suppressed by other political regimes.
Although in 1975 Bellah’s disappointment with the partition of the Ameri-
can society on social, religious and international matters provoked the publication 
of “the Broken Covenant”21 as a negation of his enthusiasm of civil religion, his 
earlier observations seem to be accurate, at least in the realm of American foreign 
policy, also today. While Haynes presented the arguments for Bellah’s disappo-
intment, such as the Vietnam War, the Watergate affair and the societal fragmen-
tation over moral and ethical issues, Bellah’s conclusions seem coherent.22 What 
seems to be neglected by Bellah, though, is the overarching aspect of his concept. 
The 1980s, being a time of conservative revival, the ‘90s and the end of the Cold 
War, which affirmed American dominance worldwide, and ultimately 9/11 and the 
18 J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Pearson Longman 2007, p. 237.
19 Ibidem, p. 104.
20 For detailed data on statistics on illegal immigration see the Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet 
of July 2011, available at: www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-apprehensions-fs-2005-2010.pdf 
[20.10.2011].
21 The electronic version is available online at: www.religion-online.org/showbook.asp?title=3042 [28.10.2011].
22 J. Haynes, An Introduction to International Relations and Religion...
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conservative revival described by Walter Russell Mead, brought a new updated 
meaning to his concept.
American religion and its impact on foreign activity
Samuel Huntington, David Mauk and John Oakland all emphasize the American 
self-portrayal as God’s chosen nation. The concept of New Jerusalem that Hunting-
ton so colorfully explains by comparing Europe to Egypt and the Americans to the 
Jews23 is supplanted by the conviction concerning the promised land that finds its 
argumentation in the miraculous survival of the first pilgrims to the New World and 
the establishment of colonies, thus providing sufficient transcendental fundaments 
for the civil religion. This miraculous salvation requires “evangelicalism”24 as 
a tribute to God’s mercy and obligation to spread his word in this world. The central 
question on such evangelism is what word? Mauk and Oakland link religion with 
democracy and liberty; however, it was Bellah who stressed the importance of the-
se basic American values through the words of George Washington:
The propitious smiles of Heaven can never be expected on a nation that disregards the 
eternal rules of order and right which Heaven itself has ordained. The preservation of the sacred fire 
of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of government are justly considered, perhaps, as 
deeply, as finally, staked on the experiment entrusted to the hands of the American people.25
Thus, what was to be considered as an American experiment became a source 
of inspiration for American foreign policy. Unlike the 19th-century diplomacy of 
the European powers that was deeply rooted in the Machiavellian portrayal of the 
world, the United States introduced a unique approach towards the international 
environment. The distinctiveness of the American political experiment required 
consistency at home and abroad. Only such an attitude could guarantee that the 
new player in the international relations could gain recognition and respect. The 
consistency required sober evaluation of the American capabilities and a clear dec-
laration of domestic values. Unlike the European states, the new state had not only 
to strengthen its position, but also to acquire respect for its alternative political sys-
tem. Such a task required the firm adherence of the American foreign policy to the 
internal political norms that included respect for the individual and promotion of 
the American political system – republican democracy. Thus, the achievements that 
were rooted in the religious freedom of the Christian tradition became cornerstones 
of American activities abroad.
23 C. Cherry, Two American Sacred Ceremonies: Their Implications for the Study of Religion in America, 
“American Quarterly” 1969, No. 21, p. 748, quoted in: S. P. Huntington, Who Are We?..., p. 104.
24 See: D. Mauk, J. Oakland, Cywilizacja amerykańska...
25 G. Washington’s first inaugural speech, quoted in Robert Bellah. The text is also available at: www.
ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=11&page=transcript [20.10.2011].
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However, this evangelical enthusiasm was challenged by the 18th and 19th-
century reality of international relations. The same George Washington, in his fare-
well address, was much more skeptical of the American role in international rela-
tions, where in a typically realist manner he recognized the limits of the new state 
and provided guidelines for a very pragmatic and moderate approach towards the 
important players on the international arena.26 In this sense, a speculative conclu-
sion can be made that even in the case of George Washington, his religious moti-
vation was challenged by other external determinants that required a much more 
realist approach towards the international attitude of the New Republic.
The American notion of predestination was adjusting steadily to the inter-
national position of the United States. This conception can be traced in every di-
rection of American expansionism, and was developed in the Manifest Destiny27 
and the following idealist programs coined by such leaders as Abraham Lincoln 
or Woodrow Wilson. Actually, a remarkable similarity can be found between the 
American idealism and the concept of predestination. This is reminiscent of the 
Christian approach towards suffering. Just as the Christians believe that suffering 
during the earthly life offers salvation, the American involvement in international 
relations was usually justified with the promising aura of a better future after the 
American engagement. The Spanish-American war of 1898 was supposed to offer 
brighter days for Cuba. The slogan associated with Woodrow Wilson of “a war to 
end all wars” is probably the most visible example of the American belief that the 
righteous cause will ultimately prevail. This pattern of moral involvement was sub-
sequently affirmed by F. D. Roosevelt’s four freedoms. As Wiesław Wacławczyk28 
has noticed, this thus determined the ideological framework of the United States as 
a country devoted to the promotion of human rights worldwide29.
26 The full version of Washington’s farewell address is available at: www.avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_cen-
tury/washing.asp [20.10.2011]. For an evaluation of Washington’s farewell address see: Ł. Wordliczek, U.S. For-
eign Policy: Procedure and Substance, Kraków 2005, p. 18; J. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process, 
Wadsworth 2005, p. 12–14. 
27 Among the literature on the subject worth mentioning are A. Stevenson’s, Manifest Destiny. American 
Expansionism and Empire of Right, New York 1996; F. Merk’s, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American His-
tory, Cambridge Ma 1995.
28 W. Wacławczyk, Swoboda wypowiedzi politycznej w USA do roku 1918, Toruń 2011, p. 437.
29 The term “human rights” requires a thorough analysis, due to the fact that it embraces too many notions 
that ultimately become the source rather of confusion that clarification. The American notion of civil liberties is 
much narrower and embraces the political and personal rights and freedoms from the Bill of Rights. The European, 
and international, meaning of the term “human rights” is much wider, and also embraces economic, social and 
cultural rights (2nd generation of rights), as well as the 3rd generation of rights. In the works of scholars like David 
P. Forsythe, Michael Ignatieff, and Andrew Moravcsik a certain feeling of disappointment at the limited notion of 
the American concept of individual entitlements can be noticed. Nevertheless, the American rhetoric on the subject 
does not take into consideration the social and economic dimensions of internationally accepted human rights, 
because it is not a characteristic feature of the American political system. Moravcsik explains this by the lack of 
a substantial socialist movement in the United States. For a broader discussion of his arguments see: A. Moravcsik, 
The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, [in:] American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. M. Ignatieff, 
Princeton 2005, p. 147–197; D. P. Forsythe, US Foreign Policy and Human Rights, “Journal of Human Rights” 
2002, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 501–521.
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The sources of American activism in foreign relations can be traced in the 
Protestant experience and its transposition to contemporary politics. Several no-
tions play a crucial role in that regard. Firstly, the notion of “chosen nation”. There 
is no other country in the world that attracts such interest and is observed so closely. 
If John Winthrop’s concept of the “city upon a hill” in the 17th century was estab-
lished for an internal purpose to unite the new community, today it has become 
a guiding light for suppressed countries and nations. The notion of predestination 
proved to be useful and necessary in every period of American history from the 
requirement to create and strengthen the nation, through the continental expansion 
and consolidation of the political structures, to the position of superpower in inter-
national relations.
However, this concept has a diametrically different understanding at home 
and abroad, and requires a short comment. For the United States, although pre-
destination is hardly mentioned explicitly,30 it offers sufficient moral explanation 
for the necessity of taking certain actions, even when popular approval is at stake. 
Actually, every major American intervention triggers the demand for a reasonable 
explanation of the U.S. involvement. Remarkably, since the Spanish-American war 
each U.S. intervention inclines an argumentation for a better future, based on the 
intrinsically American positive approach. It is grounded in the national experience 
that the rejection of oppressive systems and the transposition of power to the soci-
ety is the key to a more promising future. However, this perspective is not uncon-
ditional, and also requires the incorporation of American values in order to be able 
to achieve the desired social and political results. Unfortunately, this additional 
requirement often proves to be the most sensitive aspect of American involvement, 
since the lack of appropriate cultural, religious, politically and socially experienced 
background often creates essential obstacles for the implementation of the “city 
upon a hill” know-how abroad. The desired outcome, however, often proves to be 
more difficult than expected, and becomes a source of disappointment and radical 
anti-Americanism31.
Concluding, all of the abovementioned aspects of civil religion, such as “Go-
d’s chosen nation”, the concept of predestination, and nationalist religiosity, have 
an impact on American foreign policy. They are exposed through the concepts of 
the republican form of government and liberty that are core pillars of the American 
foreign policy.
30 Which does not mean that descriptively various presidents do not use it to justify particular actions in 
international relations.
31 The question of anti-Americanism and the impact of religion remains outside the scope of this research. 
However, it is a subject of deepened interest among scholars. See: G. Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the Ameri-
can World Order, Baltimore 2009; The Rise of Anti-Americanism, ed. B. O’Connor, M. Griffiths, Routledge 2006.
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The pragmatic nature of American foreign policy
The set of values promoted by America around the globe is based on the American 
experience, and not on utopian ideals. The U.S. foreign policy is much more prag-
matic, in a sense of attempting to promote only these aspects of the national expe-
rience that proved to be efficient at national level. As James McCormick observes, 
[…] the core American values are internal in their nature and are exposed in the Declaration 
of Independence as life, liberty and pursuit of happiness. Although they are ‘abstract ideals’ that 
serve as ‘imperative’ for action, they provide sufficient ground for explaining the nature of certain 
actions in the American activities abroad.32
Often in the official rhetoric these values are included in the more general 
notions of human rights and democracy or in a detailed enumeration of particular 
human rights dependent on the purpose.33
Since then, the promotion of human rights and democracy by the United Sta-
tes all over the world triggers permanent accusations concerning the American hy-
pocrisy on this matter. Michael Ignatieff has articulated it as a paradox that recently 
became a fundamental part of the evaluation of American foreign policy. Namely, 
why in some cases the American promotion of human rights was 
[...] as if they were synonymous with American values, while under others, it has emphasi-
zed the superiority of American values over international standards.34
Some part of this riddle is hidden behind the notion of predestination. Once 
the American perception of particular case matches the international concern, these 
values become universal. Recently, only the United States holds such remarkable 
cultural, political and spiritual attractiveness that is able to transform domestic va-
lues into international principles.
On the other hand, the established international standards aim at providing 
predictable patterns of behavior among equal players in the international arena. 
32 J. M. McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process..., p. 6.
33 For example, Barack Obama enumerated what particular rights America will promote during his speech 
“New Beginning” at Cairo University in 2009.
34 Michael Ignatieff makes the comment differently, and here we fundamentally disagree. He claims that 
“under some administrations, it has promoted human rights as if they were synonymous with American values, while 
under others, it has emphasized the superiority of American values over international standards.” I would argue that 
the development of international relations after the Cold War does not allow a generalization concerning human rights 
to be linked to particular administrations. The same Clinton administration became very active in Bosnia after 1993 
and in particular in Kosovo in 1999 and at the same time passive to the slaughtering in Rwanda in 1994. The Bush 
record on human rights is overshadowed by the loss of civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan, the existence of Guantanamo 
and the violation of domestic civil liberties, but his administration’s efforts to promote human rights in the post-Soviet 
space, the active involvement in Ukraine during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and official promotion of democ-
racy as a reply to the contemporary threats should not be neglected. For the Bush doctrine see the National Security 
Strategy of 2002. The quotation from Ignatieff is from the book American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, ed. 
M. Ignatieff, Princeton 2005, p. 1.
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However, in practice the world is not that simple, and the United States can hardly 
be equalized with other countries. Even the sole fact that in case of crisis, the worl-
d’s eyes are turned towards Washington D.C. and demand more from the United 
States than the remaining international players requires an alternative approach 
towards their international obligations35. While closely observing the American ac-
tions, the remaining players in international relations accurately expose every U.S. 
deed considered as inappropriate according to international law. This should be 
considered a natural self-protecting reaction aiming at limiting the scope of action 
of a stronger player that cannot be challenged otherwise. In this sense, every incon-
sistency and contradiction in American foreign policy, even if officially justified 
with human rights and democracy, is considered rather as a screen for U.S. impe-
rialist activity. The criticism varies from accusations of hypocrisy to open challen-
ging of American exceptionalism and non-compliance with international norms. 
However, instead of trying to answer the long list of negative comments on the U.S. 
record on human rights and democracy, it is worth analyzing what the U.S. actually 
promotes in practice. The short 1965 book Religion in the United States written by 
Benson Y. Landis, while seeking to provide the basic facts about the religious and 
denominational diversity in the U.S., reaches the following general conclusion: 
[the] General Beliefs of Four Denominations (Judaism, Roman Catholicism, Eastern Or-
thodoxy or Protestantism) … believe in one God, Creator and Sustainer of the universe, whom they 
worship. They give allegiance to Him and they acknowledge that this allegiance is their highest. 
[…] They believe that the moral law should govern world order; that international institutions to 
maintain peace with justice should be organized and preserved; that the material resources of the 
earth have been entrusted to men by God for the benefit of all.36
This rather simplistic perception of the particular denominations is domina-
ted by the Protestant evangelism deeply rooted in American society. As the moral 
law appears as the guiding force of the majority of American society in its external 
relations, it will be based on the experience and achievements that make the Ame-
ricans still “the city upon a hill”.
Recently, the majority of the promoted rights have been deeply rooted in 
the American experience. Personal rights in the United States were aiming to arm 
the individual with sufficient equipment for the “pursuit of happiness”. Religious 
freedom aimed to provide an alternative to the worst of human nature already expe-
rienced in Europe; ultimately, the political rights were to be cherished by those who 
35 Such an approach was presented during the period of cooperation between the United States and the 
United Nations after the adoption of the Rome Statute in July 1998 when, while the Clinton administration was still 
searching for accommodation of the American position in the lower-rank procedural documents of the prospec-
tive ICC, argued among other things that the international role of the United States requires privileged treatment 
by the ICC. See: S. Domaradzki, Stany Zjednoczone a Międzynarodowy Trybunał Karny. Od polityki poparcia do 
zwalczania, “Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” 2004, No. 4, p. 23–54.
36 B. Y. Landis, Religion in the United States, Barnes & Noble everyday handbooks 1965, p. 78–79.
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contributed to the society (no matter whether the Europeans like it or not).37 The 
American concept of rights is also unique in its socially acknowledged origin that 
grants it with indisputable legitimacy at home and abroad.
The limits of American foreign policy evangelism
The evangelical nature of the American soul often sees oppression of society and 
individuals as a wrong state of affairs that requires replacement. This attitude of 
Americans abroad often neglects the local circumstances as misfortunate elements 
of a bad mechanism that requires amputation and replacement by well-functioning 
democratic prosthesis. This is often perceived abroad as an element of outright 
American arrogance and lack of respect of others. Although calls for a milder, 
more sensitive and, as Daniel M. Fraser called it in 1979, “non-confrontational 
diplomacy”38 approach towards international relations have appeared in the United 
States, they are often silenced by the messianic hurrah-optimism supplanted by the 
American military power and cultural attractiveness. 
The American involvement during the Balkan wars of the 1990s can be re-
garded as a case study of such an attitude.39 The U.S. military and political in-
volvement proved to be crucial for the end of the bloody conflict in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Only the American diplomacy, while using political pressure and 
simultaneously allowing by silent approval the reinforcement of the weaker Croat 
and Bosniak forces, was able to bring the fighting parties to the negotiation table. 
Although the peace agreement brokered in Dayton and officially signed in Paris in 
1995 brought an end to the over three years of war and more than 200,000 victims, 
it created an artificial peace that totally neglects the historical, cultural and religious 
reasons for the conflict. The recent “Frankenstein” creature on the European map is 
hardly considered as a reliable partner with a stable future, and even the American 
evaluation of its development is not optimistic at all40. The European Union “hy-
gienically” deals with the local authorities, and the controlled sovereignty under 
the supervision of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina has not 
resulted in stable domestic political structures.
Kosovo provides another – probably the most radical – example of imple-
mentation of core American values abroad. A bloody dictator suppressing his own 
37 For this reason the source of American civil liberties is not the “imaginable” human dignity, but is much 
more “pragmatic” and reflects the respect for the society’s subjective judgment about the individual contribution 
to the community.
38 D. M. Fraser, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy: Some Basic Questions Regarding Principles and 
Practice, “International Studies Quarterly” 1979, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 183.
39 Although more such examples can be analyzed, such as the war in Iraq since 2003 and the recent 
American involvement in Libya.
40 P. C. McMahon, J. Western, The Death of Dayton, How to Stop Bosnia from Falling Apart, “Foreign Af-
fairs” 2009, September–October.
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citizens, whose guilt was only the fact that they belonged to another ethnic group, 
permanent instability, and the humiliation of the international community conduc-
ted by “the butcher of the Balkans,” as Slobodan Milošević was depicted, provided 
sufficient grounds for the military intervention. Only the United States41 possessed 
the necessary capacity to enforce international principles. Thus, the newly defined 
concept of “humanitarian intervention” was aiming to protect the civilian popula-
tion and secure their basic human rights.
The ultimate recognition of Kosovo as an independent state nine years later 
was met with regret by almost every Balkan state, except Albania. Such arguments 
were ultimately confronted with the American belief that the fire in Kosovo was 
extinguished and that the new political structure would be able to prove the effecti-
veness of the military actions. Today, four years later, the international community 
rather tries to ignore the dramatic economic situation, spreading corruption, and 
ethnic tensions between the Serbian minority and the Albanians and to disregard 
the fact that the Kosovo case is still considered among the sources of instability in 
the whole region.
On the contrary, the argument that is most often used to argue in support of 
the American actions in both cases is the fact that, since then, no full-scale military 
conflicts have occurred, and despite the ethnic clashes in Kosovo, and increased stif-
fening of the nationalist political parties in Bosnia, no bloodshed and war has erup-
ted. The answer continues that the decreasing interest in the region is a consequence 
of 9/11 and the new threats for American national security from the Middle East and 
Afghanistan. However, such an answer neglects the necessity for persistence, typi-
cal of any religion in order to achieve lasting well-being for the others. Furthermore, 
it totally neglects the Christian values of compassion and respect so fundamental 
to the notion of human rights. Therefore, the religious driving force hidden behind 
the values of human rights and democracy is subordinated to the list of American 
national interests that does not allow firm and equivocal promotion of moral values. 
As Morgenthau explains, ethics in international relations is situational.42
…and President Obama
Barack Obama also provides interesting material for observation as an example of 
our research on religion’s impact on American foreign policy. It has already been 
acknowledged that American presidents often use a religious note in their speeches. 
Since former presidents have been screened in that regard by others, Barack Oba-
ma is the most recent example of this pattern of behavior. His “New Beginning” 
speech in Cairo in June 2009 provides a “civil religion” template for the future 
41 Within the framework of the NATO-led operation “Allied force” that lasted from March 24 until June 
10, 1999.
42 R. Jackson, G. Sørensen, Introduction to International Relations, New York 2010, p. 70.
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speechwriters of American presidents to come. While seeking to bridge relations 
with the Muslim world, shaken by the deeds of the Bush administration, Obama did 
not compromise the main American principles. While attempting to defuse preju-
dices and to emphasize the necessity for a more promising future, the speech is an 
all-embracing model of Bellah’s description of civil religion. It includes quotations 
from the Gettysburg address and recalls the Declaration of Independence43. It re-
calls Abraham Lincoln and Thomas Jefferson’s thoughts as guiding principles for 
behavior. But most importantly, it underlines the universal value of democracy and 
human rights that leave the societies themselves to make decisions concerning their 
future. Last but not least, the religious inclination, bearing in mind also the context 
of the speech, emphasizes the similar attitude in Christianity, Islam and Judaism 
that legitimize the American efforts. 
Slightly over a year later, the U.S. ambassador to Poland Lee Feinstein de-
livered a speech at the Jagiellonian University. Among the questions he had to 
address was one about the religiousness of President Obama. The ambassador re-
plied briefly: “President Obama is a very religious man”. There is no reason not 
to believe Ambassador Feinstein. However, how much of that religious devotion 
directs the actions the president needs to take in the course of his work in the Oval 
Office, I dare not say.
Conclusion
Concluding, American values, being the core of American foreign policy, are de-
eply rooted in the religious uniqueness of the United States and their remarka-
ble historical development. The universalism of these values stems from the deep 
respect for the individual and the necessity to find an alternative, more humane, 
way of historical development. The Protestant eschatological tradition introduced 
messianism, exceptionalism and compassion as the driving forces of American fo-
reign policy. The marriage of messianism and exceptionalism shaped the nature of 
human rights and democracy and guaranteed their position as the highest priorities 
in America’s activities abroad.
The uniqueness of America’s religious impact on foreign policy is in its in-
clusive character. The civil religion, as an overarching social semi-transcendental 
consensus, deprives the American religiousness in foreign policy of its fundamen-
talist inclination. Instead, it replaces the fundamentalism with persistence, charac-
43 “So no matter where it takes hold, government of the people and by the people [my underlining – S.D.] 
sets a single standard for all who would hold power: You must maintain your power through consent, not coercion; 
you must respect the rights of minorities, and participate with a spirit of tolerance and compromise; you must place 
the interests of your people and the legitimate workings of the political process above your party […] and later ‛No 
system of government can or should be imposed by one nation by any other’.” See: President Obama’s speech at 
Cairo University. The whole text is available online at: www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
cairo-university-6-04-09 [27.10.2011].
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teristic of the pragmatic attitude of the Americans, instead of imaginary emotio-
nalism of other religions. The unique American position in international relations 
provides the necessary “channels of distribution” for American values to be spread. 
Just as the Judeo-Christian religion seemed to be universal for the colonists in the 
17th century, so the American values of democracy and human rights seem to be 
universal to the global community today. As Obama stated in Cairo,
But I do have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things: the ability to 
speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the 
equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; 
the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas; they are human rights.
The question is, is it really so?
